"Aerial warfare over Germany, the bombing attacks, necessitated more and more strong enlargements of the air defence, the flak, especially the one with light and heavy anti aircraft guns on the ground, which fought the enemy planes and inflicted loss but remained helpless in the long run."

Hans-Dietrich Nicolaisen (5-!)

Transition

After the accounts about the main operational area Schweinfurt, four chapters will yield information about theories and practice of the air defence - always with concrete reference to the conditions prevailing for the ball bearing city, where the air force helpers from Würzburg and Kitzingen risked body and life.

Chapter 5 describes on the one hand the unfavorable basic condition of the flak and on the other hand the strategy of the allied bomber command. Both aspects meet themselves during the threatening start of the bomber attacks on Schweinfurt on August 17, 1943. Inasmuch as large-scale attacks on towns of Germany were rather scarce at that time one can certainly declare that this has been a real bomber start.

Chances and Limitations of Anti Aircraft Defence

How the guns of the anti aircraft artillery were able to break open the bomber bulks.

Right after the first world war speculations commenced, how a next war would be carried out. Jochen von Lang, Author of the book and the TV series about the "War of the Bombers" cited elaborately the Italian General Guilio Douhet ("Member of a Nation, which always had a hard time to be a victor on a battle field but who understood it, to join in time the club of the winners"). Prerequisites of a future victory of land forces and marines would be the air supremacy which immediately after the outset of any war would have to be achieved, to wit, with the help of bombers" [5-2].

"Not large but many bombers"

Exactly in this sense ended a discussion during which the chief of general staff Albert Kesselring outlined to the National Marshal the possibility to chose between planes with two or four motors, when Göring decided, The Führer does not need large bombers, he needs them in high numbers" Later on he complained about the fighters and expressed favor for the flak. This happened 1944 (see in this context chapter 20.1 - in a catastrophic position).

To achieve air supremacy: this had to be the task of the bombers and fighters. To prevent air supremacy and to fight the bombers: This was the task of the fighters and the flak. The more effective field of the air defence, viz. the destruction of approaching bombers by own fighters has to remain marginal. in this documentation. For us, there is the question: What can entrenched anti aircraft guns do against hundreds and soon thousands of airplanes fully loaded with bombs?

Strongest weapon: Caliber 8.8

"In the original plans of Hitler and Göring the protection of big cities was entrusted to the anti aircraft artillery, a branch under the jurisdiction of the air force. Their strongest weapon , guns of the caliber 8.8 cm, numbered just about 500 (!) were distributed corresponding to the degree of presumable danger zones, along with approximately hundred search-light batteries. Each gun battery was directed by a Command Device which, almost like an electronic computer, processed the data of the range finder placing the ignited grenades of a battery in the air in such a way that they exploded at the target within a 50 meter circumference. They disintegrated into thousands sharp splinters, riddling airplanes which were within or near the place of explosion." [5-3]

In his essay "Blitz over England" the military historian Alfred Price describes where he sees the threefold function of the flak: "In the first place the direct destruction and the downing of enemy planes. Secondly to compel the opponent to deviate from the route and to give up closed formations thus facilitating own fighters to attack and finally, to prevent that the enemy can release bombs without taking proper aim. :At least the latter task was achieved quite often successfully by means of concentrated fire" [5-4]. Regarding the headword "concentration" one has to refer to the large battery at Ettleben with 18 guns or to the even more mighty fire power of twelve guns in a single battery at Leuna.

Flak fire compelled to draw out of line.

"Own fighters practically had no chance to attack closed formations of bombers The situation only changed when the bombers reached the zone of fire of flak guns The group of planes broke open and the US escort fighters, in principal, never entered the flak fire zone." Thus describes long after the end of the war, federal army general Fischer the starting point position of the air defence [5-5]. The fire of the flak guns compelled the bombers to climb up to an altitude of over 6000 meters and even higher as confirmed by American commentators. The more high the planes had to fly the less accurate were their bombing results.

Georg W. Feuchter in his book "History of the Air War" confirms the important role of the flak in the scope of air defence that they obtained considerable downing results and were able to defend attacks to specific targets by inflicting heavy losses. "flak often had a repelling effect where they were available in adequate numbers for the defence of objects. The disadvantage of the flak, however, consisted in their merely tactical results. This is founded in the essence of things," - in particular being tied up at a specific place and the consequent immobility.[5-6]

Air victory uncalculated risk

The recognition of the "highest importance of the flak for the defence of the homeland" [5-7] is however in blatant contradiction to the striking disregard of the flak defence, as repeatedly confirmed in the standard work of Friedhelm Golücke in his book "Schweinfurt and the strategic air war 1943".often cited herein. [5-8 G]

Within the strategic plans of the German army bomb attacks on the territory of the German Reich were only taken into consideration early 1939 as defined by Golücke on the basis of available records. Up to that time the military plans contained no concept other than continuous victories. The German success at the outset of the war silenced all reminders for precautionary measures against possible enemy bomber attacks and last not least because in Poland and France the German Air force proved in a brave kind and way their successful cooperation with the army and even succeeded to repulse clearly British attacks to German territories. Overall at that time the policy was more of a wishful thinking than one of reality.

Germans overestimated their strength

At the time when the German leaders during the second year of the war seriously considered England as an enemy - it was almost far too late. Deeply both main opponents had established misconceptions of each other, as pointed out by Golücke. Misconceptions, having negative effects to the air defence, which later on led to drafting of thousands of air force helpers.

The error on the one side "The Germans had to overestimate their strength in comparison with the opponent" - till the time when USA December 1941 entered the war and the shifting of power was incurring a fundamental change. And the error on the other side: "the allies had to underestimate their strength vis á vis Germany" which again had grave results: The Englishmen evaded into darkness." [5-9G]

Literally Cannon-Fodder for Flak

Replacement personnel for the neglected air defence was considered to be good enough

Afterwards when Adolf Hitler compelled the German Airforce Summer 1940 the extremely problematic bombing of the British Isles the "Battle of Britain", for which the bomber task force proved to be inadequately prepared the defeat with many casualties was almost bound to happen. And latest with the invasion of the Soviet Union of Hitler during June 1941 which forced further strain on the German army, the aerial war over Europe became for both sides an uncalled-for risk. No matter how The fate of the entire war was decided with the achievement of the air supremacy.

The aerial war and the promising defense of the own territory: This required on the one hand resistance of the enemy bombers with a sufficient number of fighter planes - and it necessitated on the other hand the set-up and organization of sufficient air defence. This had to be the task of the Anti Aircraft Artillery, by means of Flak Guns (literally airplane defence gun guns which sounds more or less like a "white white horse" inasmuch as the word abbreviation "Flak" already includes the "gun" (Flak = Flugabwehrkanone)

For Hitler attack had to be given priority.

Experts and historians agree with each other that for the highest War Lord Hitler, besides of bombers - fighter planes were given predominance for the support of the frontlines and not as fighters for the protection of the native country. For many generals and for a long time air defence from the ground was considered to be of subordinate importance.

For the air force helpers - whose field of activity was the flak, the evaluation of "the top people" could not have remained without aftereffect. The flak was a kind of step-child, an institution with only defensive character in which there was much less invested than for other offensive weapons. Or explained with other words Nothing or least of all was done to protect people in the flak emplacements with the help of most modern equipment, which by all means would have been possible. But what counted during such glorious times an individual soldier and what did count the air force helper who could have been replaced anyhow without any further ado, he was "cannon-fodder" in the literal sense of the word.

Disillusionment despite Success of Downing Bombers

Numerically Golücke describes condition and strength of the German flak as follows: During 1939 there existed 650 heavy and 500 light detachments. This number increased till 1944 to 1,655 heavy and 1,612 light detachments. Conclusive is really the number of guns of the anti aircraft artillery during the last but one year of the war at 1944: 21,193 each 2cm and 4,756 each 3.7cm light guns as well as 2,018 each 10.5cm and 476 each 12.8cm heavy guns. In numbers the far highest share was comprised by the "uniform type" of the heavy flak with approximately14,000 each of the caliber 8.8cm.

The judgment sounds hard: The advance of the English night bombers deep into Germany commencing May 1940, not seriously prevented by the flak, aroused most vivid criticism of the commander in chief of the air force and the head of air force ordnance . The disillusionment was so much the more lasting, when also psychological factors played a role. Instead of being incorporated seamless into a superior Home Defense Organization, there ensued especially on the lower and middle level unnecessary rivalries because the flak considered itself more than others or together with other weapons as defender of the native country versus enemies in the air. This role, however, it could not do justice to. [5-10G]

The number of downed enemy planes of the flak looks impressive. For example, 5,380 each until 21st of October 1941 and 8,706 each till end of 1942. But according to the opinion of experts it could have been more effective.

And how? Let us be satisfied at this place with the criticism of Golücke, that the superior "8.8cm gun 41" for incomprehensible reasons, was delivered in numbers worth mentioning only during the year of 1944 and that effective air defence rockets were never used, although the latter general of the flak Rüdel had demanded its introduction already during the year of 1932, prior to Hitler.

Strength of the "Reich" Air Force

Another understanding reason for the lopsided position of the flak experts see in the incessant depletion of good trained flak personal. During mobilization in Summer 1939 the flak crews had to be raised all of a sudden from 107,000 people peace strength up to almost 500,000. this was only possible with quick briefing . Moreover the AAA detachments had to release right from the beginning of the war at the home war territory fully trained staff to the front line.

And to fill the gaps which were created incessantly one replacement solution after the other one was implemented. At an early date prisoners of war were ordered to the emplacements, in particular Russians. Soon the replacements exceeded in number the permanent staff. "the share of the auxiliary staff increased commencing early 1943 by and by at the detachments of the Home Air Defence up to 45% of the authorized strength (foreigners, air force helpers, air force girl helpers Labor Service Girls). At the Home flak batteries (batteries of industrial works) and the Labor Service flak batteries the replacements came up to even 100%" resumed Horst Adalbert Koch in the publication "flak - the history of the German flak between 1935 to 1945".

The varied replacements out of young and old persons, local people and foreigners, "filled commencing Summer 1943 in ever growing extent the increasing gaps in the air defense". Koch mentions for autumn 1944 an inventory of staff of the air fleet "Reich", inclusive the Airforce Command West and the (Replacement-) Air Fleet 10 [5-11] Vis á vis regular 662,200 "regular" officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men there were 448,700 auxiliary personnel consisting out of 121,890 men of German nationality (like Labor Service flak detachments, air force helpers, AA defence men) and 128,710 women (girl flak helpers, Labor Service Girls). In addition hereto 98,200 foreign personnel (Italians, Russians, Croats etc.).

Every second member of the AAA was auxiliary personnel

The "War Diary of the Chief Command of the Army" for the 1st of November 1944 accounts for the following mentioned staff of the air force, viz.: Flying Units plus AAA 2,994,000 members, "at the same time the highest level during the war". This included 119,000 officers, civil servants and engineers, 1,970,000 NCO and EM, 475,000 civilians and "430,000 air force helpers inclusive foreign auxiliary volunteers" i.e. without corresponding split up. [5-12] As a last figure: At the end of the war the flak had a strength of approximately 1.1 million men , out of which more than half thereof (!) was Auxiliary Personnel" [5-13G]

Our documentation deals at great length with the essential waves of the replacement mobilization for the anti aircraft artillery. Commencing February 1943 secondary school pupils and pupils of grammar-school of the age groups 1926, 27 and 28 were drafted until such a time at which their total number in the ball bearing city came up to 2,500 air force helpers. In addition to the students there arrived commencing Summer 1944 apprentices like flak replacement soldiers (only eligible for use with flak) and commencing end of 1944 girl air force helpers were coerced to join the flak batteries. All of them were considered to be good enough to serve with the flak - one replacement after the other one.

In almost all emplacements at an early stage, there were used furthermore "foreigners", preferably for heavy manual work, e.g. to carry ammunition. Already during the autumn of 1943 and for the region Schweinfurt, it has been proved that there were Croatian anti aircraft legionaries clad in German air force uniforms with arm bands.. In the Schweinfurt tank barracks there was a regular battery of Croats. Also prisoners of war of other South East European nationalities were there.

Highest allotment Ukrainian and Russian

The Russians were attracting most attention in the flak batteries. The allotment of these prisoners of war with the highest number came mostly from the Ukraine and White Russia. Even at this time it is rather difficult to differentiate if these foreigners were captives or so-called auxiliary and were serving consequently compulsory or voluntary Getting better food rations itself was sufficient temptation for them .

Russian auxiliary volunteers received German Anti Aircraft Uniforms with sleeve badges ROA (Ruskaja Osvoboditelnaja Armija = Russian Liberation Army). Based on researches at the Schweinfurt Major Dr. Held, Golücke came to the conclusion, that there was no fraternization with them but the relations with them were good. Disciplinary measures were not required in Schweinfurt. Difficulties arose only later on with the self-conscious Russian SS scholars but always brought about by German personnel. [5-14G].

Defensive object undervalued

This statement would be incomplete without due reference to judgment of experts, that the flak despite of these improvised reinforcement "reached far better results" than one be allowed to anticipate. "Desperately fought the flak under the eyes of the badly suffering civilian population and under increasing own casualties", without having been in the position to alter anything. "The enemy remained stronger, the results of raids were more and more devastating. Alerts and readiness for action changed almost without any interruption with committing of troops at the hardest front line thus undermining the physical strength of in many cases youngest and older age groups of soldiers belonging to the flak." [5-15]

It goes without saying that this psychological pressure additionally undermined the fire power of the batteries. If one points out in this evaluation that the youngsters of 17 and 18 years were serving at command centers, the range finders, the core of the crew, then one can hardly add anything more. [Regarding the functions at the heavy flak see chapter 11 about the air force helpers' working day "Service and Order"] A good many reacted with horror to the idea that latest commencing February 1945 trained young girls in uniform would have to take care of these duties .

It is incomprehensible that the Führer and the Army during this second world war conceded to give absolute priority to an offensive strategy - in the farthest sense of the word to the flying formations. The defensive tasks, mainly the strengthening and the current technical improvement of the flak, on the other hand, was undervalued and neglected badly. Victim, or at least the ones to suffer for it in the light of this judgment inevitably was the air defense of the home front line. And the ones exploited most were those who had been passed on to the flak as "auxiliary helpers" - like pupil soldiers, women and prisoners of war.

Schweinfurt disarmed and rearmed

When the "Aircraft Carrier CSR" from 1939 onwards did no longer exist

In continuation to the general survey about chances and limitations of the air defence the following describes a concrete example. The situation in the ball bearing city at the river Main. It was evident, that the potential enemy as well as the planning of the German defence could recognize without fail that this industrial center is an eminently important target for bombing.

Estimation before the outset of the war

This is the assessment of an expert: "Inasmuch as the importance of the ball bearing city Schweinfurt for armament was realized for a long time by the German leadership the city had for air defence long before the outset of the war, an entire flak group for air defence," thus describes Friedhelm Golücke the original position on the basis of a comprehensive study of files and extensive personal discussions. [5-16G]

For a proper assessment of the position it is not inconsiderable that there existed a direct tangible immediate danger of the important industrial city at the upper part of the river Main from CSR, which was named quite graphically as "Aircraft Carrier Czechoslovakia" which, so to say, penetrated into the Reich. The distance Pilsen-Schweinfurt was, for example, 225 km. When 1939 the CSR was liquidated and the war broke out, this genuine danger situation did no longer exist. Moreover ground fights pretty soon moved to front lines far away in Poland and in France. Hence it was gladly assumed that the presence of flak at Schweinfurt could be reduced and dismounted.

On the day of mobilization, on the 25th of August 1939, the flak Section 192 was formed at the community house in Sennfeld. It derived from the 1st detachment of the flak regiment 28 with seven batteries. The active soldiers were provided by the 3rd permanent battery of the flak garrison Kitzingen. Already on 28th of August 1939, three heavy and three light batteries went to the provided emplacements in the region Schweinfurt. Later on, during the campaign in France, this motorized flak detachment was deployed in Rotterdam The connection Kitzingen-Schweinfurt did never disrupt. On this basis exists the tradition of the flak companionship whose active members still continue to engage themselves for Schweinfurt.

In the meantime, already September 1939, the existing flak group Schweinfurt was downgraded to a sub-group "Main" This flak group with command post Steinburg above Würzburg, contained the sub-groups Würzburg, Bamberg, Giebelstadt and Schweinfurt. But he who did trust that the war would be held far away from home, was badly mistaken.

Turning back - to wit Rearmament

However not one year later on a turning back was announced. "The British attacks commencing May 1940, which reached the Munich region an 4th of June, despite of their low strength for the time being, would allow no longer such a weak active air defence for a vital industry." [5-17G].During a discussion in September 1942, Reich Armament Minister Speer succeeded to convince the Führer and Chief Commander of the army, that besides of Friedrichshafen, Schweinfurt in particular, because of its ball bearing production, crucial for the outcome of the war, needed a special flak defence. Hitler thereupon sanctioned thereafter also reinforcements.

Flak Group in charge of Häußler

As a consequence and the understanding for the need of protection of Schweinfurt an order was issued to set up an own even though yet weak flak group Schweinfurt in charge of Major Adolf Karl Wilhelm Häußler. Häußler, born on 28th of February 1896 is portrayed as an efficient, correct and organizationally capable officer, who dealt with his task quietly and in a tireless way "Of low stature he was grand in his human qualities" was Golücke's opinion of him.

The Major, working vigorously and always quite popular, originally assigned to the 1st detachment of the flak regiment 28 in Kitzingen, marched around in his boots in the area with topographic maps measuring emplacements with a theodolite and proved to be a regular punctilious person for the ballistic flak fire calculations.

"Wander battery" around Schweinfurt

Officially he was acting as "Chief of a replacement battery" which he himself now and then named as "Wander battery". His "mobile" special unit with lieutenant Schürmann as officer for the range finders, aided by 20 men and 60 Russians as helpers - planned and developed the expansion of the ring of emplacements around Schweinfurt which originally had been set up 1938 by the flak garrison of Kitzingen.

The Major understood himself as a kind of "jumper" During the fresh set up of the batteries he was not only the taking care of planning and theories, he also lent a helping hand during the construction of fortifications. Accordingly, as figured out by NCO Ewald Olbrich, one after the other emplacements came into existence at Deutschhof, Sennfeld, Grafenrheinfeld-Fährhaus with three batteries, Schwebheim with two and finally Ettleben with three batteries. Olbrich of the "Wander circus" finally got stuck in Ettleben with first lieutenant Heidenreich.

Häußler was the father of the Kitzingen coed Doris of the air force helpers from Kitzingen who did attend during 1943/44 class seven the one out of which the camouflage unit descended from. Doris Häußler after the war became a medical doctor. At this time Mrs. Dr. Doris Zoepritz is residing at Baden-Baden. First Colonel Lt. retired, Adolf Karl Wilhelm Häußler, died at the age of 72 years on 25th of March as tax adviser in a region around Stuttgart.

Schweinfurt AAA Inventory as per mid of 1943

Starting point was around 1942/43 the following listed stock of the Schweinfurt flak as recorded in the so called flak position card dated 15th of June 1943 (5-17G).In this context it is to be remarked, that '1-1/5' batteries' had the meaning of 1 (light) battery and 1 (light) platoon.. When the drafting of the air force helpers was already in full swing, mid of June 1943, this was the flak group Schweinfurt:

11 heavy batteries
2-1/5 light batteries
1-1/5 light home AAA batteries
6 Search light batteries and
1-1/2 Smoke-screen batteries with smoke equipment

This was the situation existing at the time of the first large-scale attacks on Schweinfurt dated August 17 and not eight weeks later the one on 14th October 1943. Now, for the first time, the tables all of a sudden are turned (Refer in this connection to Chapter 9 "What the bombs caused") Before this let us have a glance at the controversy which the allies had among themselves and which kept them in suspense: The arguments about the most advantageous strategy of the bomb war. Inasmuch as these are two sides of one and the same medal - The strategies of the attack and the one of the defence conception - they are dealt with and assessed in connection with each other.

Strategy of the Allies: Americans daylight bombing, and British during the nights

The controversy about the most effective method of the aerial war

The assessment, so to say, now changes sides. We cast a glance on the interesting and conclusive controversy among the attackers, the Bomb Command of the Allied Air Forces for the best possible strategy. Before going into details, a warning reference: Those who define the word "air raid" involuntarily with the pictures out of the reports during the Gulf war, the scenes with the precise aiming devices in the attacking bombers, those computerized instruments which enabled the crews also during fog and even during the night to find and hit enemy targets, will have to change their way of thinking.

What was going on at that time is a debate between Englishmen and Americans in the mid of the Second World War, which nowadays is difficult to understand: The dispute for which attack tactics one has the suitable machine material and which concept would promise an early surrender by bombing industry, traffic links and finally the population in the Reich. The backstage contrast debated about the most suitable strategy was of decisive effect on the crews of the flak and the air force helpers in Schweinfurt, Leuna and Brix.

Great Britain was practically involved in the air war since its outset, both, as a target of German bomber raids as well as a starting place for the bomber flights into the German Reich territory. Latest since the spectacular first thousand bomber attack on Cologne on 30.05.42 British planes penetrated always more deep into the Reich territory.[5-18].

Americans plead for daylight bombing

In the meantime the United States of America entered the war on 11th December 1941. On 29th of January 1943 American task formations for the first time carried out a daylight bombing on German territory. Slowly but gradually the superior armament of USA had its effect - with a chance to win the air supremacy in Europe. In the headquarters of the Americans a self-conscious attitude prevailed. They were convinced that daylight bombing could be carried out more successfully with corresponding accuracy of sighting into the territory of the German Reich.

In his book about Schweinfurt and the strategic air war Friedhelm Golücke gives reason for the deviating attitude of the Englishmen. The British assessment of the situation and their recognition were in diametric contradiction to the one of the Americans. The remodeled and improved US bombers , altered in a hurry, would be useful for night flights asserted the Englishmen [5-19] Behind such a assessment there was hidden a healthy respect of the German fighter planes, which at that time were still dominating in the sky over Europe.

"Flying Fortress" with ten Machine Guns

"Decision over Schweinfurt" wrote 1977 ex-Pilot Thomas M. Coffey his book which goes into details about the challenge which the air war posed to the Americans after entering the war. The Boeing B-17, well known as the "Flying Fortress", was considered to be at the US Air Force as the most progressive American heavy bomber. After its test in the aerial combat against German fighter pilots the Englishmen declared these flying fortresses as "miserably inferior". Coffey concludes that the Americans had to rely on the Flying Fortress "because they had no other bomber. The new North American B-25 "Liberator" had made less progress in their development." [5-20}

Equally doubtful as the value of the "best bombers of America" according to British assessment was also the strategic concept of the US-Headquarters. "After having nevertheless equipped the B-17 with ten 12.7mm machine guns and the new, considerably accurate Norden bomb aim device , the Americans intended, to carry out daylight bombing of exactly determined military and industrial targets in Germany". They simply calculated that a mighty and closed bomber formation of such "fortresses" had to be strong enough, thanks to a massive machine gun fire, to ward off attacking German fighters successfully. In such a concept the flak obviously does not play any remarkable "deterrent" role.

Night Area Bombings

The Englishmen reacted to these plans full of dismay, knows Coffey. With reference to their own success against German daylight attacks on targets in England they insisted on their concept, to destroy German cities during the protection of the night - by eliminating flak and fighters. To cause destructions as not otherwise feasible under such conditions, viz.: by area bombing.

Exactly 18 months after arrival of the advance section of the Bomber Command of the 8th US Air fleet in England, Brigade General Ira C. Eaker gave order to his air fleet consisting of over 200 "Flying Fortresses" to carry out the hitherto greatest American air combat "to raid the vital German ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt", as described by Coffey. (see further on sub-section 5.5) Under the command of Eaker was also the heavy October attack on Schweinfurt (see Chapter 9.1: "Bomber attack on 14th October").

After both large-scale attacks the Allies accounted the position, as put in a nutshell by David J. Irving: With the flak alone Germany would not have been able to cope with the situation, but only with the fighters rests their only chance. Would they become aware of this and "with gigantic efforts once again reverse the control in the aerial war and ward of the attacking bombers from the sky?" Without bombers and without air supremacy an Allied invasion in France would not have been thinkable.[5-21].

The first large-scale air raid : Bomber start on 17th August 1943

Simultaneous "Twin" blow against Regensburg and Schweinfurt

The third large-scale attack was no longer carried out under the command of Brigade General Eaker. During December he was transferred to the Command of the Allies in the Mediterranean. At first he tried to resist, but then he gave in. He met the British Prime Minister after his reassignment in Casablanca, and he felt satisfaction that Winston Churchill told him, the expectation of the brigade general had been "more than confirmed: The bomb attacks around the clock now show the results which you have predicted." [5-22].

Beginning of attacks relatively late

A series of facts during the bomber attacks on Schweinfurt seem to be relatively surprising. For example, that the first large-scale attack on the ball bearing city was carried out rather late, namely on 17th of August 43. And that the second one followed only two months thereafter on 14th October 1943. And that it needed four full months until the third attack punished the city and its ball bearing production again on 24/25.02.44 in the form of a threefold -wave, of one daylight and two night air raids within twelve hours. (for more details see chapter 10 about the "Black Friday" and there section 10.4 on page 133 of the book).

When describing the first two large-scale air raids we'll consider both aspects looked into together: the tactics of the bomber formations and the defense strategy around Schweinfurt. "The objective of the US 8th Bomber Command was the destruction of the Regensburg Messerschmidt Works and the Ball Bearing factories in Schweinfurt. It was to be the most daring and largest-scale air raid which the Bomber Command had carried out so far. Both locations were more far away than all other targets hitherto visited. The RAF was supposed to carry out simultaneously an attack during the night." [5-23G]. And parallel hereto the 9th US Bomber Command from Egypt (!) ought to bomb the Aircraft works at Wiener Neustadt. For the first time a kind of pliers operation against the two big fighter plane manufacturing works in Regensburg (mainly Me 109) and in Wiener Neustadt.

On 17th August 1943 Schweinfurt went through the first real large-scale air raid ("large-scale", if more than hundred enemy bombers released their bomb loads over a city). "Contacts with the enemy" around the cordon of anti aircraft did occur until that time hundred of times: aero reconnaissance flights, flights passing the overall-area. And later on there would be aero low level attacks (ground strafing) which are not listed as attacks in the closer sense. In the notes about the activities of the flak batteries, besides of incessant air-raid warnings - there were recorded shootings and occasionally also downing of planes , which were not officially related to "attacks" on the city.

Authors and Sources for the air-raids

thus the 17th of August 1943 was registered in the town history as the first day of a large-scale attack. Eduard Jabolonski's military strategic description "Double Strike" appeared 1975 in Stuttgart with the German title "Doppelschlag gegen Regensburg und Schweinfurt " [5.24]. An important book about a s single large-scale air raid. About the August air-raid as well as the next bomber wave on 14th of October 1943 stands equally devoted by an American, Thomas M. Coffey in his researches under the title "Decision over Schweinfurt" which appeared 1978 at the Ullstein publishing house and the German title "Entscheidung über Schweinfurt" [5-25].Thoms Coffey, himself a bomber pilot during the war, this promises the book, "lets one relive the new development in the Allied strategy in their fight against Hitler: the precision daylight bombing."

Friedhelm Golücke finally concentrates himself to the description of the second large-scale air raid of 14th October 1943. In addition to both American authors he is certainly the most competent expert on the German side. Friedhelm Golücke gave his work which appeared 1980 the title "Schweinfurt and the Air War Strategy 1943" [5-26G].

Raids by 230 bombers

It is tempting but it would lead too far away to describe both raids elaborately. We have to be satisfied with a brief account, methodical details and matter-of-fact figures about targets and results.

"83 official air-raids of varying order and effectiveness preceded the twin stroke of the 8th US Bomber Command of 17th of August 1943 on the Messerschmidt Works in Regensburg and the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt" found out the American author Eduard Jablonski to continue "the blow of August 17 was the most difficult, the most ambitious and was supposed to be the most destructive of all former raids. Never before were so many men and airplanes participating in such an undertaking"...[5-27].

The August raid of the 8th US Bomber Command was flown by at least 230, possibly 300 bombers of type "Flying Fortress". Approximately 3,000 high explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped within the brief time of 24 minutes. The raid began at 14.30 hours, unexpectedly for most people, for it was the first heavy bombardment and the surprise intensified the effect of the bombs.

Protective mist over the city

Over Schweinfurt there was "a protective mist". The fog did not protect the city of bomber raids, but disabled the fog clad batteries. They were shooting, guided by the radiolocator, but because of the tinfoil the fire was going in all directions and hit premises and chimneys." [5-28].

The first wave, approaching from Southwest, dropped their bombs over the railway quarter. Two trains were destroyed, because they were not able to be moved out of the station in time. The railroaders were still waiting for a few empty milk-cans, thus delaying their departure. - The second wave devastated the center of Schweinfurt .

Among else the bombs of the third wave hit the tank barracks badly. Here more than 40 soldiers were killed. "It was a severe shock for the aircraft helpers to see numerous soldiers, having been exercising on the yard of the barracks, who were lying killed by a direct hit in the shelter trench." Also the premises of the buildings in the neighborhood of the tank barracks suffered numerous hits, likewise the surrounding living quarters where the civilian population suffered many casualties. In his report an aircraft helper noted, that by hearsay after the raid there were flak helpers who were wounded in a neighboring battery. [5-29B].

Not too high a price?

The destructions and the losses on the German side were disastrous,. mainly the devastation of factories and housing facilities. .The number of people killed among the Schweinfurt population was officially mentioned to be 203.

The tongs like "twin raid" on Schweinfurt and at the same time on Regensburg, i.e. on two important armament centers of the Reich, is regarded in a retrospect as a "brilliant cunning trick of a genius" irrespective of the fact that it became "one the most bloody raids during the second world war causing heavy losses". According to the opinion of military authors the twin raid of 17th August 1943 is entered in the history of war as "one of the two most fierce air raids of all times." [5-30].

According to details furnished by the Allies - in Schweinfurt and Regensburg together - a number of 60 machines out of 291 Flying Fortresses were downed. At that time this was a huge number. "No air force could afford this rate of loss of 19 percent But if the Germans lost 99 out of 300 fighter planes, this corresponds to a loss of 33 percent." Coffey, who presented this comparison noted the conclusion of the Commander General Ira C. Eaker: "If the raid on the ball bearing industry did hit as comprehensively as can be deduced from the aerial photographs, then the loss of 60 machines, although terrible, is not too high a price".

This was the language in the glorious times which generals used to speak. On both sides. Concerning the relation between loss of the attacker and the defender, Werner Dettelbacher cites the relation as follows: for each American bomber shot down there is the loss of five German fighter planes [5-31].

Continuation:

The wounds of the bomber raid of 17th August had not healed for a long time, when further classes of students arrived to become Aircraft helpers in Schweinfurt. Their experiences (chapters 6 and 7) are to be described inclusive a brief view of those who were retained in their classes [chapter 8].

Thereupon there is described the effect of the large-scale air raid of August 1943, the expansion of the "flak cordon Schweinfurt" and the second large-scale air raid dated 14th October 1943 [chapter 9] - as per assessment of the Allies: "Triumph of Daylight Bombing" .